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WHAT IS THE ISSUE?
The main issue is whether grain reserves shall be held
by the U.S. government for the purposes of meeting
emergency needs and reducing year-to-year market price
variations, or whether publicly-held grain reserves will
continue to be a by-product of supporting certain farm
commodity prices. From this basic issue, several related
question arise. \\'hat instabilities come from no, or in-
adequate, reser es and who is affected? \Vho gains and
who lose from reserves? How large should reserves be?
What mix of commodities should be included? What
price and quantity rules should be established for ac-
quiring and releasing stocks? What will reserves cost and
who will pay this cost? Is the United States morally ob-
ligated to stockpile food for the world's hungry people?
WHY IS THIS AN ISSUE?
The main reasons given for having commodity re-
serves are:
1. To have adequate supplies for domestic needs from
one production period to the next;
2. To reduce price risk and improve efficiency in
grain production by encouraging long-term investments
in agriculture;
3. To provide the basis for more stability in the live-
stock and poultry industries;
4. To stabilize food prices to consumers;
5. To maintain or enlarge exports and encourage
trade liberalization by being a reliable supply source;
6. To facilitate food assistance programs for needy
people at home and in other countries. .
Recent interest in publicly-held grain reserves comes
from: year-to-year variations in supply since 1972, fear
of food shortages in poor crop years, export embargoes,
increasing commercial exports, higher food prices to
consumers, and sharp fluctuations in grain prices.
World grain stocks (including rice) averaged 170 mil-
lion tons in 1960-72, enough for three month's con-
sumption. By 1975, stocks had declined to 123 million
tons. \ ith good crops in 1976, stocks are estimated to
rise to 150 million tons at the beginning of 1977-78
marketing year.
From 1950 through 1971, food-deficit countries re-
lied upon the U.S. and other major grain exporters to
carry sufficient stocks to stabilize supplies and prices.
This confidence was badly shaken by the set of circum-
stances occurring in 1972-75 which depleted grain stocks
in the U.S. and world-wide, causing concern over possi-
ble food shortages.
GRAIN RESERVES UNDER THE 1973 ACf
Provision was made to establish a reserve of inven-
tories not to exceed 75 million bushels of wheat, feed
grains and soybeans to alleviate distress caused by natu-
ral disaster. Except for this small reserve, the Act con-
tinued the price support loan and storage program which
has been used since 1938 to provide floors under prices
of specified products. Reserves are acquired when farm-
ers deliver these products to commodity credit corpor-
ation instead of redeeming their loans. CCC stocks can
be released when prices rise above certain levels.
Under this non-recourse loan program, government-
held stocks tended to accumulate in the 1950's and
1960 's as agricultural technology boosted total crop
production more than enough to offset supply-reducing
effects of land retirement and additional exports under
P.L. 480. Once acquired, these surpluses were regarded
as costly and price-depressing. In times of greatly in-
creased foreign needs due to war or crop failure, the sur-
pluses are suddenly transformed into "stragetic reserves."
Few fa~mers participated in the loan-and-storage pro-
gram in 1973, 1974, or 1975 but they are doing so for
1976 wheat and feed grain crops. When these loans ma-
ture, CCC will again own stocks of grain unless market
prices rise enough so farmers payoff the loans.
FOOD RESERVE POLICY CHOICES
AND THEIR EFFECfS
The principal policy choices in regard to reserves are:
stocks held by producers and marketing firms with little
government intervention; supplementary government-
held stocks; multi-national reserves held by importing
and exporting nations; international commodity re-
serves; and some combination of these.
Reserves Managed by the Private Sector of the Economy
Producers and marketing firms own and control re-
serves. They decide how much to store and when to sell
or buy. In good crop years prices will decline; when
crops are short prices will rise sharply.
Development of private grain stocks would be con-
sistent with a farm policy of setting prices in the market.
Under this alternative the stocks would primarily be
used for commercial objectives. Producers hold grain
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stocks because they expect the price to rise more than
enough to cover their storage costs. The grain trade
would tend to be more concerned with volume and mar-
gin per unit rather than holding stocks for humanitarian
purposes. Responses to an emergency might be too slow.
When food is stored, someone pays storage costs.
These costs will either be passed back to the producer as
lower prices or forward to the consumer as higher prices.
U.S. experience in marketing years 1972-73, 1973-74,
and 1974-75 demonstrated what can happen to prices
received by farmers and paid by consumers for food
when stocks are depleted due to production shortfalls
and greater foreign demand. This may lead to export
restrictions and uncertainty among importers as to U.S.
reliability of a supply source.
Consequences of private reserve management are:
(1) Price instability to producers due to variations in
world supply and demand conditions, but higher average
prices over time;
(2) Higher food prices in years of short crops but lit-
tle, if any, decline in years of abundant supplies due to
the in flexibili ty 0 f marketing margins;
(3) Possibility of under or over-holding of reserves by
producers and processors because of inadequate market
information and lack of organization; and
(4) Low government costs for administering, storing
and maintaining food reserves; storage costs shared by
producers and consumers.
Supplementary Government-Held Reserves
Some people feel that grain stocks carried voluntarily
by producers and the grain trade will be inadequate and
that the nation's food policy goals will be more nearly
achieved by a well-managed public grain reserve program.
One proposal for managing reserves, in effect, sets
both upper and lower limits on farm prices. At the lower
limit, the loan prices, stocks are bought; at the upper
price limit, stocks are released. A variation of the release
provisions calls for disposal of a certain percent of
stocks for each 10 percent increase in price above the
release activating price. Prices fluctuate between the two
levels. The general price level is the market price deter-
mined by quantity of stocks. This procedure may come
into operation if the 1973 Act is extended but with
higher target prices and loan rates.
Another approach establishes a level of reserves which
the government holds until a policy decision is made
that an emergency exists, justifying release of stocks.
Advocates of publicly-held reserves point to thes.e de-
sired results: (1) increased price stability, (2) reduced
risk, (3) less need to impose export embargo.es, and (4)
greater consumer assurance of an adequate and depend-
able supply of grains. Price stability reduces risk in live-
stock production. It makes marketing decisions easier
for grain farmers. It reduces swings in food prices and
thus helps reduce inflationary pressures as well as con-
sumer and labor pressures on government. .
Those who· oppose government reserves suggest that
reserves: (1) distort market signals, (2) depress farm
prices, (3) .discourage importing countries from holding
reserves - placing the full burden of reserves on the
American taxpayer, (4) are subject to political manipu-
lation and (5) are costly to manage and hold.
Reserves Held by Importing and Exporting Nations
Besides establishing a supplementary publicly-held re-
serve, the U.S. government could encourage other coun-
tries to establish their own grain reserves. An additional
stabilizing influence on world commodity markets could
result from setting up a world-wide information system
on crop prospects and national grain stocks. Bilateral or
multilateral import-export agreements might be consid-
ered as a way to reduce foreign demand u~certain~y. ~o
long as free trade does not exist and na~IOns maIntal?
programs to protect their agriculture, gr~m .reser:e polI-
cy is likely to coexist with export restr~ctlOns, Import
controls, farm price supports and productIOn controls.
Consequences of multinational reserves are:
(1) Greater stability in world commodi ty prices;
(2) Adequate supply of food for U.S. consumers;
(3) Lower cost to American taxpayers than previous
storage programs;
(4) More efficient food production;
(5) Location of reserves where needed; and
(6) Possible depressing effect on grain prices.
Reserves controlled by an international organization
Acquisition and distribution of emergency grain re-
serves by an international organization has been pro-
posed as a method of preventing mass starvation after
natural or man-made disasters. Such reserves would not
be used in situations of chronic malnutrition due to
overpopulation. International grain reserves could also
be used for stabilization of commercial markets.
Either program could be financed 'by contributions in
kind from food exporting nations and in cash from
developed, but food importing, countries. Size of re-
serves, amount of contributions and recipients' eligi-
bility requirements would be established by agreement.
Probable consequences of internationally controlled
emergency grain reserves include:
(1) Ability to respond quickly to alleviate human
hardships caused by unpredictable calamities;
(2) Little effect on prices so long as reserves are small
and not released in commercial channels;
(3) Possible pressures from poor, hungry nations to
release reserves for chronic food deficit problems;
(4) Possible attempts by food surplus nations to en-
large reserves to prevent low farm product prices; and
(5) Complex administrative, political and diplomatic
problems peculiar to an international organization.
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